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This study assesses the determinants of location choices of foreign
multinational ﬁrms at the level of German federal states. Adjacency
and existing ﬁrm networks are assumed to inﬂuence the investors’ prof-
its in a given location by overcoming informational disadvantages when
entering the new market. A conditional and a nested logit model re-
semble the structure of the location choice process of individual in-
vestors well. By using aﬃliate-level data between 1997 and 2005, the
results conﬁrm that ﬁrms react positively to local demand, a common
border and existing ﬁrm networks, while unit labour costs exhibit the
expected negative impact. In the sectoral estimations, it is shown that
these eﬀects vary in their relevance among manufacturing and service
aﬃliates, and between upstream and downstream activities.
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The reuniﬁcation of the formerly separated Eastern and Western German
states in 1990 entailed exceptional interregional diﬀerences within one coun-
try. Today, almost 20 years after the fall of the Berlin wall, a huge rift persists
along various characteristic lines: low productivity, high unemployment and
low network eﬀects keep drawing down the attractiveness of the East Ger-
man federal states for private investment in general, and for Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) in particular (see Uhlig, 2008). Over the period 1997-2005,
only around 10% of all Multinational Entreprise’ (MNE) aﬃliates were es-
tablished in East Germany, half of which in Berlin. Buch and Toubal (2008)
conﬁrm a low integration of East Germany into international markets with
respect to trade and migration as well. Although these measures report a
considerable dispersion also across West German federal states, it seems fair
to state that multinational activity has not yet contributed to closing the
East-West gap.
In response to the New Economic Geography (NEG) framework by Krug-
man (1991), a range of empirical studies emerged investigating the regional
and urban determinants in the location decisions of ﬁrms (see e.g. Crozet,
Mayer, and Mucchielli, 2004 for France; Barrios, Görg, and Strobl, 2006 for
Ireland and Basile, 2004 for Italy). In Germany, media and academic research
have been heavily concerned with ﬁrms shifting their production facilities to
low cost countries while staying comparably silent about the determinants
and eﬀects of inward FDI. Although recent papers ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive
impact of inward FDI on domestic ﬁrms (see e.g. Arndt and Mattes, 2008)
and on the local economy (see e.g. Bitzer and Görg, 2008), there exists – to
the best of my knowledge – no study investigating the regional determinants
of the location choices of foreign multinationals in Germany.
In accordance with advances in location choice theory, this study adopts
a monopolistic competition framework and assumes that a ﬁrm decides for
a certain location if the achievable proﬁts outweigh the proﬁts that can
be gained in all other available locations (for similar approaches compare
also Head and Mayer, 2004; Inui, Matsuura, and Poncet, 2008 and Mayer,
Méjean, and Nefussi, 2007). Among the variables inﬂuencing a ﬁrm’s proﬁt,
the ﬁxed costs of market entry have often been ignored. Most studies that
are based on a NEG framework refrain from specifying this term of the proﬁt
function despite the notion of Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) that the
ﬁxed costs of establishing an aﬃliate abroad involve a plant- and a country-
(or region-)level part. Fujita and Thisse (1996) conﬁrm that the location
choice of an MNE might depend crucially on information spillovers arising
from industry clusters. Although the authors originally thought of spillovers
as improving the production function, they can – if speciﬁc to each German
federal state – drive a wedge between the entry costs into the potential
markets. In addition to network eﬀects, adjacency to the source country
1may drive down ﬁxed costs through information advantages. Thus, if ﬁxed
costs are a decisive parameter for market entry of foreign multinationals and
vary across German federal states, they might explain part of the regional
dispersion of the locations of MNEs’ aﬃliates. Hence, this study lays some
importance on identifying these costs.
The ﬁxed costs speciﬁcation through national industry clusters and com-
mon borders suggests that the determinants of inward FDI vary among in-
vestors from diﬀerent countries of origin as well as across sectors. Recent
studies support a more diﬀerentiated examination of MNE activity. In par-
ticular, the distinct role of trade aﬃliates (as opposed to foreign production
plants or to other export modes) has called a lot of attention in the theoret-
ical (Krautheim, 2007) and the empirical literature (Hanson, Mataloni, and
Slaughter, 2001). Interregional diﬀerences may, consequently, also translate
into a distinct sectoral composition of multinational activity.
This study aims at explaining the regional dispersion of foreign multina-
tionals’ aﬃliates by exploiting the ﬁrm-level Micro database Direct Invest-
ment (MiDi) of the Deutsche Bundesbank. The MiDi is a full sample survey
of foreign ﬁrms’ aﬃliates in Germany.1 Merging the FDI data at the level
of individual aﬃliates with information on German federal states extracted
from the Federal Statistical Oﬃce gives a very rich database that allows as-
sessing the impact of the theoretically derived regional drivers of inward FDI.
The conditional logit and the nested logit model are employed to estimate
the relative probability with which a multinational investor chooses a certain
location. By relaxing the restrictive Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
(IIA) assumption the nested logit is able to account for expected diﬀerences
between East and West German federal states as location alternatives.
The analyses of this study add to the existing literature in three aspects:
ﬁrst, the combination of FDI data at the aﬃliate-level with regional data
at the level of German federal states allows for a thorough assessment of
the determinants of location choices of MNEs within Germany. Second, by
explicitly modelling the ﬁxed costs of ﬁrm entry, a border dummy and ag-
glomeration variables are formally included into the empirical set-up. Third,
the empirical evidence equips policy makers with useful information on how
to attract MNEs in general and MNEs that have speciﬁc home countries and
that operate within certain sectors.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 lays out the theoretical model
which motivates the empirical speciﬁcation. Section 3 describes the estima-
tion strategy with the conditional logit (Section 3.1) and the nested logit
(Section 3.2) model. After presenting some descriptive statistics on the de-
pendent variable in Section 4.1, the independent variables are explained in
1Direct investment enterprises with a balance sheet total below a certain threshold do
not need to be reported. Since 2002, this threshold corresponds to a balance sheet total
up to and including three million e.
2Section 4.2. Section 5 discusses the results of the empirical examination.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
Multinational ﬁrms face a set of location options when deciding to undertake
an investment abroad. The selection of a particular location depends on the
potential proﬁts associated with that location exceeding the potential proﬁts
associated with all other available locations. This study follows Redding and
Venables (2004), Amiti and Javorcik (2008) and Mayer, Méjean, and Nefussi
(2007) in adopting a Dixit-Stiglitz-type monopolistic competition model and
extends it with regard to the speciﬁcation of ﬁxed costs and internal market
access. The total proﬁts of a single representative ﬁrm located in region i




[(1 − ti)(pij − ciφij)xij] − fik (1)
with pij representing the prices to which the ﬁrm sells its output xij in
the j available markets. The ﬁrm’s proﬁts are reduced by the taxes ti a ﬁrm




labour and land as the two production factors and wages and land rents as
their prices), by the iceberg-type transport costs φij and by the sunk ﬁxed
costs of the investment, fik. According to Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple
(2004), ﬁxed costs are higher for foreign than for domestic ﬁrms, because








depend on the inverse of the costs of entry into a foreign market Zi and
on the costs of duplicating overhead production Nik. Variables in Zi are
region- and origin country speciﬁc, whereas the number of ﬁrms, Nik, may
also vary among industries (the index of the source country is omitted for the
sake of simplicity). Both variables are assumed to reduce the informational
disadvantage of foreign ﬁrms and facilitate thereby the entry into a speciﬁc
market i.4 In line with the propositions of Fujita and Thisse (1996), Nik is
2Firm heterogeneity with respect to location choice cannot be assessed with the avail-
able information in the MiDi. For this reason, the simple model assumes one representative
ﬁrm.
3In contrast to the proximity-concentration literature, ﬁrms have to cover ﬁxed costs
only when setting up an additional aﬃliate abroad; exporting the output to any other
market is only subject to variable transport costs.
4A high number of ﬁrms in an industry also reﬂects low plant-level economies of scale.
This interpretation corresponds more closely to Helpman et al.’s deﬁnition of the plant-
level part of ﬁxed costs.
3an agglomeration variable that entails spillovers among ﬁrms from the same
sector and the same country of origin. In the present set-up, a high elasticity
of substitution σ (σ > 1) and thus, intense competition will, however, reduce
each ﬁrm’s willingness to share information with new entrants. Hence, the
















is the eﬀective demand level for the products sold by an aﬃliate on all
potential markets depending positively on the expenditure shares Ei and
Ej and negatively on the mill price pi. It is assumed that a multinational
ﬁrm can either sell its output in the chosen region i or in all other regions
L(l ∈ L), but not abroad. In either case, goods face iceberg-type trade costs
φii (φil) before reaching their ﬁnal destination. With the underlying demand









in the home market i and in all other markets L respectively; the mark-up
over the marginal costs depending negatively on the elasticity of substitution.
A few mathematical transformations lead to the testable equation



























which motivates the following log-linear empirical speciﬁcation where
variables are allowed to vary over time






+ γ7 lnNikt + γ8Zi + νi + ǫikt. (6)
Equation (6) subsumes the demand and the price indices into an internal
and an external market access variable (MAit and MAlt). It also includes
region dummies to account for unobserved heterogeneity among location
alternatives such as the elasticity of substitution σ.
Although equation (6) describes the proﬁts of a representative ﬁrm, the
magnitude of the independent variables may in fact vary for investors from
4diﬀerent countries and operating in diﬀerent sectors. In an empirical pa-
per, Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2001) emphasise that the motives
underlying the establishment of wholesale and manufacturing aﬃliates diﬀer
and propose, therefore, a distinction of distribution- and production-related
FDI activities. In this spirit, Krautheim (2007) shows that the decision be-
tween various entry modes (in particular, these are exports and FDI through
wholesale aﬃliates or through production plants) depends on their distinct
cost structures. Although the present analysis assumes that the fundamental
investment decision has already been taken, and that the only choice that
has to be made is the aﬃliates’ location, a sectoral view seems appropriate.
A simple discrimination of manufacturing from service industries misses out
the speciﬁc role of wholesalers and retailers. In line with Defever (2006), this
study additionally distinguishes upstream and downstream activities. Down-
stream activities correspond to the post-production distributional activities
of wholesalers and retailers. Upstream activities subsume the pre-production
stage activities of R&D centres and headquarters. Weichenrieder and Mintz
(2007) argue that, apart from taxes, the economically eﬃcient bundling of
activities in one country motivates the existence of holdings. In this sense,
holdings act as local or third country headquarters and can be perceived as
undertaking upstream activities. Despite of the notion of Weichenrieder and
Mintz (2007), their classiﬁcation as a pre-production service is, however, at
best an approximation of upstream activities. In fact, the heterogeneous
nature of holdings would require more detailed information about actual
occupations and tasks for which data is not available in the MiDi.
In a nutshell, this study assumes ﬁxed costs to play a predominant role
in the proﬁt-maximising location choice of a ﬁrm. The adopted speciﬁcation
assumes that existing ﬁrm networks and adjacency to the country of origin
mitigate the information disadvantages of foreign over domestic ﬁrms and fa-
cilitate thereby the entry into a speciﬁc regional market. The theroretically
derived location choice determinants are expected to vary across diﬀerent
source countries and across sectors. Against the background of a recently
raising interest in occupational and sectoral diﬀerences in ﬁrm international-
isation, manufacturing and services and upstream and downstream activities
will separately be examined.
3 Empirical Methodology
After formally deriving a testable equation, the identiﬁed push and pull
factors with a special focus on the ﬁxed costs of market entry will be assessed
empirically. To this end, the following section introduces the econometric
concepts of the conditional (3.1) and the nested logit model (3.2). Both
estimation procedures ﬁt the present questions particularly well since they
allow presenting the choice of a certain location as the proﬁt maximising
5decision of a multinational ﬁrm.
3.1 The Conditional Logit Model
While the actual proﬁts associated with each location cannot be observed, in-
formation about the location choice and regional characteristics is available.
The derived observable and unobservable variables (compare equation (6))
inﬂuence the proﬁt of each alternative location and therefore the probabil-
ity to invest in region i. The ﬁrm-level database MiDi contains information
about the federal state, in which an MNE’s aﬃliate is located, about its
sector and the source country of the investment. Since it does not contain
any information about the foreign mother, the location choice is assumed to
be made upon regional characteristics only (for a more detailed description
of the dependent and explanatory variables, see Section 4). The conditional
(ﬁxed eﬀects) logit model resembles well a ﬁrm’s location decision in a par-
ticular market by estimating the relative probability of choosing a certain
location i in dependence of its own characteristics xi and of the character-







The iid error terms follow an extreme value distribution which ensures
the somewhat restrictive IIA property. Equation (7) reveals that the ratio
of probabilities of investing in two locations is independent of the charac-
teristics of the other alternatives. Hence, all alternatives exhibit the same
degree of substitutability. This assumption is likely to be violated with data
on location decisions of MNEs in Germany since the motives for undertaking
a direct investment in distinct regions could diﬀer. E.g., investors may take
advantage of the persistent gap between Eastern and Western federal states
to pursue diﬀering strategies with aﬃliates in the two regions. Hence, it
seems apt to assume that these investors do not perceive all German federal
states as being equal substitutes one to another. If this assumption was
true, the standard conditional logit model would, due to its IIA property,
underestimate the probability of investing in some states and overestimate
the probability of investing in other states. Although region-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects help to mitigate unobserved correlations among alternatives, the strat-
egy is costly and does not resolve problems associated with cross-sectoral,
cross-country or inter-temporal diﬀerences in the perceived attractiveness of
German federal states (see Section 5.1 for a discussion).
63.2 The Nested Logit Model
The restrictive IIA property inherent to the conditional logit model calls for
a more ﬂexible approach that allows for at least some correlation of the error
terms. The nested logit model relaxes the IIA assumption by partitioning
the set of alternatives into subsets. Within the speciﬁed nests, the unob-
served factors ǫi are allowed to be correlated while independence continues
to hold across nests. A plausible nesting structure for the present analy-
sis is the division of the entire set of alternatives into Eastern and Western
federal states. Investors choose then between East and West Germany in
the upper level and between regions within the two subsets in the lower level
model.5 The probability of choosing region i then depends on the product of
two probabilities: the probability of choosing region i conditional on having




times the marginal probability of choosing nest n







m exp(ρzm + λmIVm)
(8)




is called the Inclusive Value (IV) and
gives the expected proﬁt an average investor receives from choosing a lo-
cation i within nest n. Its estimated parameter λn reﬂects the degree of
independence between the unobserved portions of the proﬁt functions. For
λn = 1, the alternatives are completely independent and the nested logit
model collapses into the conditional logit model described above. For λn = 0,
alternatives within nests are perfect substitutes and only the nest choice mat-
ters for the location decision. McFadden (1978) shows that the nested logit
speciﬁcation is consistent only with random utility maximisation if λm is
signiﬁcantly estimated to lie in the range of [0;1] ∀m.
A potential problem arises with respect to the availability of data. By
construction, the sample is restricted to multinational ﬁrms and excludes
domestic ﬁrms and exporters. Hence, it is not possible to model a discrete
choice process with a ﬁrst step decision on the entry mode and a second step
decision on the chosen location as proposed by Mayer, Méjean, and Nefussi
(2007). As Basile, Castellani, and Zanfei (2008) point out, however, this
shortcoming does not aﬀect the explanatory variable coeﬃcients if the error
terms of the two nests (entry mode and location choice) are uncorrelated. In
this case, changes in the proﬁtability of one entry mode entail proportional
changes in the proﬁtability of each location choice without aﬀecting the odds
ratios.
5The division into an upper and a lower level decision does not imply a sequential
decision making process. Even when investors have decided for a certain nest, they still
have some probability to choose a region from another nest, although this probability
decreases in the preference towards the chosen nest.
74 Data and Variables
Section 4.1 provides a short description of the MiDi and how the dependent
variable has been extracted from the database. It continues with giving some
descriptive evidence of the distribution of MNE aﬃliates across German fed-
eral states. Section 4.2 explains the construction of the explanatory variables
measuring the location choice determinants.
4.1 The Dependent Variable
The data on inward FDI come from the ﬁrm-level MiDi provided by the
Deutsche Bundesbank (for details on this database see Lipponer (2008). The
MiDi is a full sample survey of foreign ﬁrms’ aﬃliates in Germany. Direct
investment enterprises with a balance sheet total below a certain threshold
(currently three million e) need not be reported, and the reporting limits
have changed over time. To avoid changes in the explanatory variables re-
sulting from changes in reporting limits, all observations that are not covered
by the most restrictive reporting requirements are dropped. At the regional
level, this study distinguishes FDI projects into 16 German federal states
which correspond to the Nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques
(NUTS) I regions of the European Union (EU). Note that ﬁrms report their
FDI to the regional branches of the Bundesbank in the state where they are
headquartered. Yet, the location of the ﬁrms’ headquarters may not coincide
with the state in which they have their main production units.6 While this
fact may lead to incorrect inferences with respect to the intensive margins of
FDI activity, the extensive margin is less aﬀected. Hence, this study focuses
on the location choices of the MNEs’ regional headquarters and refrains from
making statements about the aﬃliates’ sales or employment levels.
In addition to the chosen federal state, information on the sector groups
of the aﬃliates can be retrieved from the MiDi. The over 100 NACE Rev.
1 sectors are, for the purpose of this study, aggregated into 37 broader in-
dustries. In order to capture the initial location choice, each aﬃliate enters
the estimation sample only once – in the founding year. Thus, if an aﬃliate
has parents from several countries, it is attributed to the country of origin
of the ﬁrst investor. For this reason, the original worldwide country sample
reported in the MiDi reduces here to 79 countries that have established an
aﬃliate in Germany within the considered time frame 1997-2005. In princi-
ple, the MiDi is a panel dataset since 1996. To ensure, however, that only
newly established aﬃliates are considered, aﬃliates already present in 1996
are excluded from the calculations.
Figure 1 gives an overview of the distribution of foreign aﬃliates within
Germany. The left map plots the percentage of aﬃliates established in each
6For Germany as a whole (foreign and domestic ﬁrms), headquarters and aﬃliates are
located in the same state in about 76% of the cases (Monopolkommission, 2006).
8federal state over the period 1997-2005. Three regional groups can be distin-
guished. North Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria, Baden-Wurttemberg and Hesse
hosted between 1997 and 2005 over 70% of all foreign multinationals’ aﬃli-
ates. In contrast, the nine lowest ranked states together did not even attract
10% of all investment objects. Although there is some variation also within
the Eestern and the Western part of Germany, the observation translates
into an East-West disruption.7 While foreign investors established between
1997 and 2005 766 aﬃliates in an average Western German federal state,
they founded during the same time only 141 aﬃliates in an average Eastern
German federal state.8
Figure 1: Spatial Distribution of Aﬃliates (1997-2005)












































































Note: NRW: North Rhine Westphalia; BY: Free State of Bavaria; BW: Baden-Wurttemberg;
HE: Hesse; HH: Hamburg; NI: Lower Saxony; B: Berlin; RP: Rhineland Palatine; SH: Schleswig-
Holstein; SN: Free State of Saxony; BR: Brandenburg; HB: Bremen; SL: Saarland; TH: Thuringia;
SA: Saxony-Anhalt; MV: Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania.
Source: Own calculations. Data from Deutsche Bundesbank.
This observation holds generally true for the percentage of per capita
investments, plotted in the map on the right. With the exception of Berlin,
each East German federal state hosted between 1997 and 2005 less MNEs’
aﬃliates per capita than each West German federal state.
The regional distribution looks similar for the ﬁve most important coun-
7Note that Berlin is attributed to East Germany throughout the analysis.
8Buch and Toubal (2008) report similar gaps for the degree of trade openness and
immigration.
9tries of origin (see Figure A.1), which account for 67% of all aﬃliate set ups
in Germany over the period 1997-2005. It is striking that Switzerland and
the Netherlands invest disproportionately into the adjacent federal states of
Baden-Wurttemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia, respectively. In contrast,
out of the six East German federal states, only Berlin and Saxony appear
among the top ten locations of the biggest investors.
Eastern and Western German federal states do not only diﬀer in terms
of the total number of established MNE aﬃliates but also in terms of the
sectoral composition of inward FDI. Four sectoral groups are considered in
this paper: service aﬃliates, manufacturing aﬃliates and as complementing
the latter, upstream (R&D and holdings) and downstream (wholesale and
retail) activities. Figure 2 indicates that manufacturing activities make up
for a larger part of inward FDI into East Germany, while services and es-
pecially downstream activities such as wholesale and retail aﬃliates are a
major factor in West Germany. This seems surprising at ﬁrst sight since
one might expect high-tech manufacturers to be located close to high-skilled
human capital in West German industry clusters and downstream activities
that do not rely on a specialised labour force to be spread across the coun-
try. The discussions of Section 2, however, suggest that market access is of
predominant importance for downstream activities, which is arguably higher
in the West German federal states.
The descriptive analyses support the theoretically derived location choice
determinants. Investors prefer large markets in the West, where a common
border and existing ﬁrm networks also facilitate their entry. The tendency
towards investing where the sales potential is high gets support from the
sector composition of investments. Downstream activities make up for a
large part of total foreign investment in the West, while the East hosts
mainly manufacturing aﬃliates.
4.2 The Explanatory Variables
Information on German federal states is extracted from the Federal Statisti-
cal Oﬃce.9 In a ﬁrst set of regressions, the variables derived from equation
(5) are considered. The taxes tit are expected to lower a ﬁrm’s proﬁt in
a location. For the present analysis, only those tax rates that vary at the
federal state level are included – namely the real estate and the business tax.
Wages and land rents are the prices of the two input factors. Following the
critique by Bellak, Leibrecht, and Riedl (2008), gross wages are not an ade-








9For a complete list of explanatory variables, see A.1 in the Appendix
10Figure 2: Sectoral Composition of the Total Number of Aﬃliates in East


















Note: The service sector is deﬁned as excluding wholesale, retail and R&D aﬃliates as well as
holdings.
Source: Own calculations. Data from Deutsche Bundesbank.
with empit as the total employment and gvait as the gross value added
in region i at time t. The unit labour cost measure bears the advantage of
being more directly linked to the proﬁtability of FDI.10 Regions lose compet-
itiveness (and are therefore expected to attract less FDI) if wages are high
and/or if productivity is low. Market access in the chosen location i, a pull
factor for foreign investors, is represented by the GDP of market i. Low in-
ternal transport costs guarantee a good attainability of potential customers.
φiit is therefore approximated by a local infrastructure index, constructed
out of the relative length of motorways, roads, rivers and the number of
airway passengers. Not only the local sales potential, but also the access
to other markets inﬂuences the location choice of a foreign investor. The
external market potential is calculated in accordance with Harris (1954), as
the inverse distance-weighted sum of incomes,
10In the absence of a regional price deﬂator, the unit labour costs are measured in
nominal terms. Proﬁtability therefore depends also on a ﬁrm’s ability to pass on increasing












With respect to the ﬁxed cost speciﬁcation, two variables are employed.
As it is assumed that investing in an adjacent region entails informational
advantages, a border dummy serves as a proxy for the regional-level part of
ﬁxed costs. The number of plants with the same country of origin within
an industry approximates the plant-level part of ﬁxed costs. In order to test
whether network externalities are still present among competitors from dif-
ferent countries of origin, a non-nation speciﬁc agglomeration variable will
additionally be included. Both cluster variables are expected to facilitate
the market entry and attract new investors, but to diﬀerent extents as infor-
mation ﬂuctuates better within nation-speciﬁc networks.12
In a second set of regressions, a number of control variables are added
to the baseline speciﬁcation. With these policy variables, the possibilities
of federal state governments to actively undertake measures in order to at-
tract foreign multinationals can be assessed. One important policy ﬁeld,
which remains conducted under the governance of the federal states in Ger-
many, is education policy. Regions compete for the best educational system
and substantial diﬀerences in the performances are regularly conﬁrmed by
the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) study
(compare e.g. Heller and Ziegler, 2007). Speciﬁcally, I include public R&D
expenditures, the share of university graduates and the share of school leavers
without a degree to evaluate the importance of research and education for
the attractiveness of a region. It has to be noted that the ongoing emigration
of young skilled East Germans to the West (see e.g. Buch and Toubal, 2008)
might considerably weaken the tool of education policy to attract investors.
Since the causality between migration, education and employment oppor-
tunities is, however, not clear ex-ante, it seems worthwhile to assess these
additional controls. Finally, a variable measuring the population density of
a federal state will be included. Even more than for the whole sample, this
variable is, in the light of the discussions of Sections 2 and 4.1, expected to
provide new insights at the sector level. Investors seeking for new sales op-
portunities may prefer to locate their wholesale and retail aﬃliates in highly
11Harris (1954) assumes the price indices to equal zero. Redding and Venables (2004)
propose a market potential measure that is more rigorously derived from theory. Their
approach requires the estimation of a trade equation to obtain the trade cost parameters.
Since data on bilateral trade ﬂows among German federal states is not available, market
potential is here calculated according to Harris (1954). Head and Mayer (2004) stress that
Harris’ measure outperforms the approach by Redding and Venables (2004), particularly
if national borders do not matter.
12To avoid an endogeneity bias in the empirical estimations, variables measuring the
costs of the production factors, the market potential and the clustering of ﬁrms are lagged
by one period. The count of aﬃliates is then increased by one unit in order to avoid
loosing many observations by taking the log of zero.
12populated areas. Manufacturers, in contrast, could even be deterred by a
high degree of urbanisation.
5 Results
This section presents the results of the conditional and nested logit estima-
tions of the location choices of MNEs in Germany. First, the estimations
on the whole sample will be discussed (5.1). Second, this exercise will be
repeated for the most important sectors in order to account for potential
diﬀerences among them (5.2). Third, the ﬁve most important countries of
origin will be assessed individually (5.3). In all regressions, the continuous
variables are taken in logs, which permits an interpretation of the estimated
coeﬃcients as the approximate elasticities of the probability of an average
investor choosing region i (Train, 2003).13
5.1 Estimations on the Whole Sample
The results from the nested logit estimation are displayed in Table 1. For the
regressions in columns (1)-(4), the IV parameters are signiﬁcantly estimated
to lie in the range of [0;1]. The Likelihood Ratio (LR) test rejects the null
hypothesis of the IIA, hence, the conditional and the nested logit model can-
not be perceived as equivalent. One possibility to mitigate the IIA problem
characteristic to the conditional logit model is to include federal state dum-
mies as is done in column (6) of Table A.2. This strategy is valid as long as
investors have uniform perceptions about the attractiveness of regions. Table
A.2, column (6) reveals that the inclusion of federal state dummies leads to
substantial changes in the estimated coeﬃcients. While the signs and mag-
nitudes of the agglomeration variables and the border dummy remain stable,
taxes, factor prices, and the infrastructure variable become insigniﬁcant. By
contrast, the coeﬃcients on the local and the external market potential in-
crease dramatically. This result is not entirely surprising and in line with the
ﬁndings of Crozet, Mayer, and Mucchielli (2004) for inward FDI into French
departments. As in their study, diﬀerences in market potential may be more
important over time than across federal states. For the other explanatory
variables, in contrast, the time-invariant cross-sectional component explains
location choices better than the time series variation, an eﬀect, which is in
the speciﬁcation of column (6) already absorbed by the ﬁxed eﬀects. Since
the adopted nesting structure is valid, I refrain from further commenting the
13In fact, the presented coeﬃcients are slight overestimates of the elasticities of location
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for the nested logit model. Hence,
the higher the number of alternatives (and nests), the closer is the estimated coeﬃcient
to the actual elasticity.
13conditional logit results (see Table A.2).14
Column (1) contains the results for the basic equation without land prices
due to the fact that these were not available for the entire sample. Business
taxes have the expected negative sign, while the real estate tax somehow sur-
prisingly shows a signiﬁcant positive impact. High unit labour costs decrease
the probability for a state being chosen as an FDI location. Internal market
access as well as – although to a lesser extent – Harris’ external market po-
tential, help attracting foreign investors. A good local infrastructure allows
for a better attainability of potential consumers in the periphery. Finally,
the ﬁxed cost speciﬁcation of equation (2) seems valid. Both a higher num-
ber of existing aﬃliates with the same source country and within the same
industry and the existence of a common border reduce the costs of entering
a foreign market and induce investors to decide for that particular federal
state.
In general, the results remain stable with the inclusion of the prices for
building land in column (2). However, the tax rates can no longer be esti-
mated as being signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The positive coeﬃcient of
land prices is striking in this context. Together with the positive coeﬃcient
of the real estate tax rate in column (1), the result suggests a density ef-
fect in metropolitan areas, which attracts investors despite of the relatively
high prices. Finally, the inclusion of a variable measuring the costs of the
second production factor, land, reduces the negative impact of unit labour
costs. The other coeﬃcients remain stable in terms of sign, magnitude, and
signiﬁcance level.
In column (3), in addition to the number of aﬃliates in the same sector
and with the same country of origin (nat. cluster), the total number of aﬃli-
ates in the same sector aggregated over all foreign countries of origin (cluster)
is included. As expected, the positive inﬂuence of the aggregate cluster vari-
able is smaller than the impact of the country-speciﬁc cluster variable. The
ﬁnding corroborates that ﬁrms particularly beneﬁt from national networks,
where no language or cultural barrier impedes informational interchanges
(Buch, Kleinert, and Toubal, 2006). Interestingly, the coeﬃcient of cluster
has decreased as compared to columns (1) and (2). This result corresponds
well to the theoretical prediction of intense competition lowering positive
network externalities.
From the additional control variables in column (4), only the share of
university graduates has a statistically important impact. While the avail-
ability of a highly qualiﬁed workforce matters for the location decision of
MNEs, non-skilled workers, public R&D expenditures and population den-
14Note, however, that overall the nested logit coeﬃcients seem to be equal in sign,
but smaller in magnitude and less statistically signiﬁcant than their conditional logit
counterparts in Table A.2. This ﬁnding suggests that inside East and West Germany
the push and pull forces of the explanatory variables are weak compared to the situation
where the federal states are chosen independently of the nests.
14Table 1: Nested Logit Estimations
Dependent variable: choice between federal states
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln business tax -1.03*** -0.60 -0.53 -1.27**
(0.31) (0.37) (0.39) (0.60)
ln real estate tax 0.70*** 0.30 0.28 0.61
(0.17) (0.20) (0.21) (0.51)
ln unit labour cost (t-1) -2.26*** -1.51*** -1.55*** -0.91*
(0.25) (0.33) (0.34) (0.48)
ln land price (t-1) 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.14**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
ln market access (t-1) 0.47*** 0.46*** 0.42*** 0.51***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08)
ln infrastructure 0.35*** 0.23* 0.21 0.36
(0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.25)
ln market potential (t-1) 0.07* 0.06* 0.06 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
ln nat. cluster (t-1) 0.50*** 0.51*** 0.37*** 0.37***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ln cluster (t-1) 0.12*** 0.13***
(0.02) (0.02)
border 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.24*** 0.26***










East 0.40*** 0.44*** 0.48*** 0.48***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
West 0.76*** 0.77*** 0.78*** 0.80***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
LR test (IIA) 95.94*** 63.87*** 51.53*** 45.02***
Observations 102256 91204 91204 83700
Investments 6391 6049 6049 5580
Note: This table presents the estimation results of equation (6). The regressions are based on
the nested logit estimator. The IV parameters in the [0;1] interval and the signiﬁcant LR test
statistic conﬁrm the nesting structure with East and West Germany as two nests. The dependent
variable is the discrete choice of multinational ﬁrms to locate in one of 16 German federal states.
The independent variables are as described in Section 4.2 and as listed in Table A.1. Based
on the speciﬁcation of column (1), columns (2), (3) and (4) successively introduce land rents,
non-nation-speciﬁc industry clusters and R&D expenditure, university graduates, school leavers
without a degree and population density as additional control variables. Standard errors are in
parentheses with signiﬁcance at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 level.
Source: Own calculations.
15sity do not seem to play a role. The theoretical discussion of Section 2 and
the descriptive statistics presented in Section 4.1 suggest, however, to look
at sectors and activities individually. Especially, distribution-related func-
tions of trade aﬃliates might react to regional conditions diﬀerently than
production-related activities of manufacturing aﬃliates.
5.2 Sector-Speciﬁc Estimations
Table 2 reports the estimates for the manufacturing and the service sector
as well as for pre- and post-production activities. The ﬁrst columns contain
the results for the baseline speciﬁcation; the second columns introduce the
policy control variables.
Columns (1) and (2) report the location choice determinants of service
aﬃliates, excluding wholesale, retail and R&D aﬃliates as well as holdings.
In contrast to the comparable regressions on the whole sample (Table 1,
column(3)), Table 2, column (1) indicates that taxes and the local infras-
tructure are relevant for service aﬃliates. Furthermore, the coeﬃcient of the
common border dummy is slightly higher. This last ﬁnding may be due to
the complexity of some services that necessitate the adjacency to the parent
company. In general, the results are robust to the inclusion of the additional
control variables in column (2), although the evidence for land rents and tax
rates is somewhat ambiguous.
The heterogeneity of the service sector requires, however, a diﬀerentiated
analysis. To this end, columns (3) and (4) contain the results for downstream
activities, like wholesale and retail trade and columns (5) and (6) report
the estimates for upstream activities, like R&D and holdings. Taxes and
local infrastructure do not seem to matter for wholesale and retail aﬃliates.
This result is plausible against the ﬁnding of a large, positive coeﬃcient
of population density in column (4).15 Direct customer proximity rather
than the accessibility of potential consumers is crucial for the location of
downstream activities at the regional level. The large positive eﬀect of local
market access (and also the positive coeﬃcient of land prices in column (3))
supports this interpretation and is also in line with Hanson, Mataloni, and
Slaughter (2001). The authors ﬁnd that US wholesale aﬃliates have higher
sales in high-income countries.
Turning to the upstream activities (columns (5) and (6)), we ﬁnd that
only few of the standard location choice determinants exhibit importance.
It is noteworthy, however, that the agglomeration variables have a lower im-
pact on upstream activities. If holdings provide headquarter services it is
15Note that in column (4), the LR test cannot reject the IIA property. As a robustness
check, the regression has been repeated using the conditional logit model. The results
conﬁrm the relevance of urbanisation for downstream activities as indicated through a
positive signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of population density and market access. The results of this
exercise are not presented here, but can be made available upon request.
16Table 2: Nested Logit Estimations for Diﬀerent Sectors and Activities
Dependent variable: choice between federal states


















ln business tax -1.02 -2.10* -0.70 -0.96 -1.36 -3.31 -0.65 -1.39
(0.79) (1.11) (1.10) (1.85) (1.47) (2.16) (0.57) (1.01)
ln real estate tax 0.95** 1.08 0.29 -2.07 1.05 1.98 -0.06 0.77
(0.44) (0.92) (0.60) (1.38) (0.84) (1.72) (0.31) (0.88)
ln unit labour cost (t-1) -3.52*** -3.12*** -1.92** -1.54 -1.82 0.87 0.44 1.49
(0.66) (0.80) (0.92) (1.25) (1.18) (1.67) (0.57) (0.91)
ln land price (t-1) 0.20*** 0.15 0.34*** 0.07 0.09 0.30 0.02 0.12
(0.07) (0.10) (0.11) (0.17) (0.11) (0.18) (0.05) (0.09)
ln market access (t-1) 0.45*** 0.56*** 0.43*** 1.05*** 0.62*** 0.98*** 0.48*** 0.58***
(0.06) (0.16) (0.08) (0.38) (0.11) (0.27) (0.05) (0.11)
ln infrastructure 0.61** 0.79* 0.59 -0.55 0.75 0.96 -0.02 0.24
(0.29) (0.47) (0.41) (0.71) (0.53) (0.86) (0.21) (0.42)
ln market potential (t-1) 0.09 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.08 -0.17 -0.01 -0.11
(0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.14) (0.20) (0.06) (0.11)
ln nat. cluster (t-1) 0.33*** 0.29*** 0.42*** 0.43*** 0.33*** 0.22** 0.30*** 0.34***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.1) (0.11) (0.05) (0.07)
ln cluster (t-1) 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.07** 0.07** 0.06 0.09* 0.11*** 0.12***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
border 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.40*** 0.36*** 0.23** 0.30** 0.13** 0.17***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.06) (0.07)
ln R&D -0.14 -0.43 -0.46* -0.10
(0.14) (0.28) (0.23) (0.11)
ln univgrads 0.11 -0.04 0.04 0.08
(0.14) (0.21) (0.22) (0.08)
ln nongrads 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.26
(0.25) (0.41) (0.44) (0.23)
ln popdensity 0.05 0.73** -0.11 -0.13
(0.15) (0.32) (0.25) (0.13)
IV parameters
East 0.56*** 0.49*** 0.54*** 0.65*** 0.46*** 0.35** 0.40*** 0.44***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.19) (0.13) (0.14) (0.07) (0.10)
West 0.81*** 0.75*** 0.94*** 0.92*** 0.82*** 0.78*** 0.74*** 0.81***
(0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13) (0.05) (0.09)
LR test (IIA) 14.18*** 10.75*** 20.75*** 4.53 8.96** 6.57** 15.95*** 18.13***
Observations 29738 26970 22135 20535 8772 7620 27188 25380
Investments 1971 1798 1469 1369 580 508 1805 1692
Note: This table presents sector-speciﬁc estimation results based on the nested logit estimator. Columns (1) and (2) report results for other services, excluding
wholesale, retail and R&D aﬃliates as well as holdings. Columns (3) and (4) report results for downstream activities of wholesale and retail aﬃliates and Columns
(5) and (6) for upstream activities of holdings and R&D aﬃliates. Columns (7) and (8) report results for manufacturing aﬃliates. The independent variables of
the respective ﬁrst columns are as in Table 1, column (3) and of the respective second columns as in Table 1, column (4). Standard errors are in parentheses
with signiﬁcance at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 level.
Source: Own calculations.
1
7reasonable to believe that they act independently from potential competi-
tors. Interestingly, a high level of public R&D expenditure detracts MNEs
from locating their R&D and holding activities in a certain federal state.
One possible explanation for this might stem from the actual low number
of R&D aﬃliates within this category. They make up for only around 5%
of all aﬃliates conducting upstream activities. Since holdings are, except
for serving as a local headquarter, also established for tax reasons (see We-
ichenrieder and Mintz (2007)), they might have claims at odds with usual
pre-production activities.
The results for the manufacturing sector are reported in columns (7) and
(8). Two main diﬀerences with respect to the service sector in general and
with respect to downstream activities in particular are striking: ﬁrst, having
a common border with the chosen location is less relevant for manufactur-
ers. Second, the relatively low IV parameter (East) suggests that Eastern
German federal states are viewed as especially close substitutes by these
investors. Thus, since the main investing countries are Western economies
(compare Figure A.1) and since manufacturers make up for a large share of
investments in East Germany (compare Figure 2), the result seems to de-
scribe the particular situation of Germany well. Education policy does, like
for the other sectors and activities, not matter for manufacturers. As already
noted, the possibilities of local policy makers to gain regional competitive-
ness might be considerably weakened by a highly mobile East German labour
force.
5.3 Source Country-Speciﬁc Estimations
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 have indicated that a common border is relevant for
the probability to decide for a certain location but plays less of a role for
manufacturers. This ﬁnding may already partly explain the speciﬁc situation
of the East German federal states. Existing nation-speciﬁc ﬁrm networks also
appeared as a robust location choice determinant, suggesting that it might
be crucial to attract a number of aﬃliates from one country which spurs
then – ideally via a self-reinforcing process – additional investments from
the same country.
To see which regional factors actually pull or push investors from the
most important source countries, Table 3 displays the individual regression
results for the ﬁve most important countries of origin. The LR test and
the IV parameters support the nesting structure for Dutch, US and British
investors. The LR test could not reject the IIA assumption for Swiss, British
and French investors. For this reason, only the conditional logit results are
reported for these source countries of inward FDI in Germany.
At the individual country level, it is remarkable that taxes matter only for
Swiss and US investors, while the latter do not respond to unit labour costs.
In contrast, US MNEs seem to be located in metropolitan areas where land
18Table 3: Conditional and Nested Logit Estimations for the Most Important
Countries of Origin
Dependent variable: choice between federal states
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NL USA CH GB F
ln business tax -1.00 1.27 -4.12** -0.63 0.18
(0.93) (1.10) (1.82) (2.08) (1.68)
ln real estate tax 0.31 -1.11* 1.85** 1.05 0.48
(0.51) (0.58) (0.88) (1.15) (0.85)
ln unit labour cost (t-1) -2.76*** -0.05 -3.83** -3.80** -2.90
(0.83) (0.93) (1.75) (1.69) (1.96)
ln land price (t-1) 0.13 0.26** 0.24 0.27* 0.13
(0.09) (0.10) (0.18) (0.15) (0.17)
ln market access (t-1) 0.24*** 0.40*** 0.22* 0.65*** 0.19*
(0.07) (0.08) (0.13) (0.15) (0.11)
ln infrastructure 0.60* -0.30 1.31** 0.34 0.61
(0.32) (0.40) (0.62) (0.71) (0.62)
ln market potential (t-1) -0.05 0.16 -0.30* 0.30 0.00
(0.08) (0.11) (0.18) (0.19) (0.16)
ln nat. cluster (t-1) 0.26*** 0.19** 0.28*** 0.26** 0.49***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
ln cluster (t-1) 0.20*** 0.27*** 0.31*** 0.36*** 0.21**
(0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08)







LR test (IIA) 8.75** 9.46***
East-West dummy Yes Yes Yes
Federal states dummies No No No No No
Pseudo R
2 0.25 0.29 0.18
Observations 20246 12906 9996 9099 8593
Investments 1343 857 663 604 571
Note: This table presents country-speciﬁc estimation results based on the nested and the condi-
tional logit estimator. The IV parameters in the [0;1] interval and the signiﬁcant LR test statistic
conﬁrm the nesting structure for the Netherlands (column (1)) and the US (column (2)); for
Switzerland (column (3)), Great Britain (column (4)) and France (column (5)) the conditional
logit results are reported instead. The independent variables are as in Table 1, column (3). (Ro-
bust) standard errors are in parentheses with signiﬁcance at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
level.
Source: Own calculations.
19prices are also high. Using wages instead of unit labour costs and omitting
land prices, Crozet, Mayer, and Mucchielli (2004) ﬁnd that US investments
even react positively to high wages in French regions. Like in this paper, the
authors further estimate a relatively low impact of market access on Dutch
investors (column (1)).
When looking at the most important source countries individually, as-
sessing the ﬁxed cost speciﬁcation is of particular interest. The descriptive
analysis of Figure A.1 indicates that aﬃliates of Swiss and Dutch multina-
tionals are predominantly located in the adjacent federal states of Baden-
Wurttemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia. In the empirical results of Table
3, a common border is, accordingly, estimated to exhibit a signiﬁcant inﬂu-
ence on investments from these countries as well as from France. Further-
more, the agglomeration variables indicate that country networks are most
important for French investors with a coeﬃcient of 0.49 and least important
for US investors (with a coeﬃcient of 0.19). It is remarkable that MNEs
from the US, Great Britain and Switzerland, who are assumed to be less af-
fected by language barriers when investing in Germany, are even to a larger
extent attracted by industry clusters in general than by industry clusters
consisting of ﬁrms from the same country. Dutch and French investors, on
the contrary, beneﬁt more from nation-speciﬁc agglomeration. Hence, the
empirical evidence not only for the whole sample and for the sectoral regres-
sions, but also for individual countries of origin validates the adopted ﬁxed
cost speciﬁcation in equation (2).
The importance of network and border eﬀects has implications especially
for East Germany. While the lacking adjacency to strong investing coun-
tries is an insuperable problem for East German policy makers, they might
consider the promotion of industry clusters. This could be an especially
promising strategy with regards to investors that do not heavily rely on
nation-speciﬁc networks.
6 Conclusions
This study examined and identiﬁed the main determinants of inward FDI
into German federal states during the time span 1997-2005. Three questions
were highlighted: ﬁrst, in the theoretical part, a proﬁt function was derived
according to which foreign multinationals choose their locations. Common
borders and nation-speciﬁc industry clusters were thought of as facilitating
market entry. Possible particularities with regard to the distribution-related
activities of trade aﬃliates were mentioned. Second, the speciﬁc situation
of East Germany in terms of attracting less MNEs’ aﬃliates and depend-
ing largely on the manufacturing sector was accounted for by adopting a
nesting structure. The IV parameters of the baseline regressions all point
at a higher degree of substitutability among Eastern as compared to West-
20ern federal states. Third, the empirical estimations conﬁrm the theoretical
presumptions: the theory-consistent speciﬁcation of ﬁxed costs shows a sig-
niﬁcant inﬂuence in the conditional and the nested logit estimations with
the common border and existing ﬁrm clusters turning out as very robust
determinants of inward FDI. The individual country regressions showed that
network eﬀects arise from aggregate industry clusters as well, but are less
important for French investors. Finally, the sector estimates conﬁrm that
downstream industries prefer to locate in highly populated, wealthy (West
German) federal states.
The ﬁndings are of high interest not only for the scientiﬁc community but
also for policy makers. The insight that local demand and unit labour costs
signiﬁcantly inﬂuence foreign investors in their location choices represents
indispensable information for regional policy makers when reﬂecting about
ways to enhance the location attractiveness in general or to investors from
certain sectors or countries. This latter strategy might be particularly sound,
since a critical mass of aﬃliates from one industry and one country proves
to be a reliable pull factor for other investors that operate in the same sector
and have the same country of origin.
Although insightful, this study is limited by the availability of data.
Due to lacking information about the characteristics of foreign multina-
tional ﬁrms, a possible heterogeneous behaviour of ﬁrms investing at home
or abroad cannot be accounted for. This task has therefore to be left for
future research.
21A Appendix
Figure A.1: Total Number of Aﬃliates by Country of Origin (1997-2005)


























































































Note: In order to retain the conﬁdential nature of the data, country of origin-federal state com-
binations with less than three observations have been made anonymous and deﬁned to count at
least three observations.
Source: Own calculations. Data from Deutsche Bundesbank.
22Table A.1: List of Variables
Variable Deﬁnition Source
business tax Business tax in percent Federal Statistical Oﬃce
real estate tax Real estate tax in percent Federal Statistical Oﬃce
unit labour cost Unit labour costs measured as the ratio of
labour compensation per labour input and
labour productivity
Federal Statistical Oﬃce
land price Prices of building land per qm
2 Federal Statistical Oﬃce
market access GDP in federal state i at current market prices Federal Statistical Oﬃce
infrastructure Infrastructure index calculated from the length
of motorways, other streets, rivers and the
number of airway passengers
Federal Statistical Oﬃce
market potential GDP in federal states l at current market
prices weighted by the inverse of Great cir-
cle distance between federal state i and federal
states l as measured by the haversine formula
Federal Statistical Oﬃce; Latitudes and Lon-
gitudes from GPS Visualizer
border Dummy = 1 if region i and the source country
share a common border
Federal Agency for Carthography and Geodesy
cluster Number of MNE aﬃliates in the same industry MiDi
nat. cluster Number of MNE aﬃliates in the same industry
and with the same country of origin
MiDi
R&D Public R&D expenditures Federal Statistical Oﬃce
univgrads Share of university graduates in the total num-
ber of graduates
Federal Statistical Oﬃce
nongrads Share of school leavers without a degree in the
total number of graduates
Federal Statistical Oﬃce
popdensity Number of inhabitants per qm
2 Federal Statistical Oﬃce
2
3Table A.2: Conditional Logit Estimations
Dependent variable: choice between federal states
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln business tax -2.68*** -2.84*** -1.05* -0.86 -2.30*** -1.61
(0.46) (0.47) (0.56) (0.56) (0.83) (1.62)
ln real estate tax 1.96*** 2.05*** 0.86*** 0.72** 0.49 -0.09
(0.23) (0.24) (0.30) (0.30) (0.72) (1.36)
ln unit labour cost (t-1) -3.63*** -3.47*** -1.95*** -1.96*** -1.04* 1.46
(0.34) (0.37) (0.46) (0.46) (0.61) (2.75)
ln land price (t-1) 0.29*** 0.27*** 0.14* 0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.12)
ln market access (t-1) 0.69*** 0.67*** 0.61*** 0.54*** 0.86*** 5.30**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.12) (2.41)
ln infrastructure 0.79*** 0.81*** 0.37* 0.29 0.25 -0.67
(0.17) (0.17) (0.20) (0.20) (0.36) (1.90)
ln market potential (t-1) 0.13** 0.13** 0.13** 0.12** -0.01 9.04*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (5.34)
ln nat. cluster (t-1) 0.65*** 0.66*** 0.64*** 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.44***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ln cluster (t-1) 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
border 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.31*** 0.33*** 0.35***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
ln R&D -0.22** -1.07**
(0.11) (0.45)
ln univgrads 0.20** 0.10
(0.09) (0.12)
ln nongrads 0.51*** -0.28
(0.18) (0.27)
ln popodensity 0.23* -7.22
(0.13) (5.17)
East-West dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Federal state dummies No No No No No Yes
Pseudo R2 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.25
Observations 102256 102256 91204 91204 83700 83700
Investments 6391 6391 6049 6049 5580 5580
Note: This table presents the estimation results based on the conditional logit estimator. The
dependent variable is the discrete choice of multinational ﬁrms to locate in one of 16 German
federal states. The independent variables are as described in Section 4.2 and as listed in Table A.1.
Based on the speciﬁcation of column (1), columns (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) successively introduce
an East-West (0/1) dummy, land rents, non-nation-speciﬁc industry clusters, R&D expenditure,
university graduates, school leavers without a degree and population density as additional control
variables and federal state dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses with signiﬁcance
at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 level.
Source: Own calculations.
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